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1   Introduction 
 
Contemporary theories of consciousness such as higher-order theories (see Armstrong 
1968; Lycan 1990; Carruthers 2000; Rosenthal 2005) and self-representationalism (see 
Kriegel and Williford 2006) attempt to give an account of the consciousness of our 
mental states. This specific kind of consciousness was already investigated by Franz 
Brentano under the name inner consciousness. One of the main concerns of this renow-
ned philosopher of mind was to give a description of inner consciousness which would 
avoid an infinite series of mental states. I refer to this problem as the infinite regress 
problem. The principal aim of this paper is to evaluate whether Brentanian inner con-
sciousness succeeded in solving the infinite regress problem.  
Many things could be said about the genesis and the impact of Brentano’s concep-
tion. However, my aim is not to provide a historical reconstruction of Brentanian inner 
consciousness. Even though I will focus on Brentano’s statements, I will not discuss 
them in chronological order, nor will I try to decide whether and when Brentano 
changed his mind. From an exegetical point of view, what I will try to do is identify the 
different readings of Brentano’s account and decide which is the most plausible one. 
From a systematic point of view, what I will try to do is conceptualize these readings 
as rigorously as possible and discuss their theoretical implications.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, I present the account of inner con-
sciousness given by Brentano; second, I discuss this account in light of the mereology 
outlined by Brentano himself; third, I consider whether this account incurs an infinite 
regress. I distinguish two kinds of infinite regress: external infinite regress and internal 
infinite regress. I contend that the most plausible reading of Brentano’s account is the 
so-called fusion thesis, and I argue that internal infinite regress turns out to be inherent 
to Brentanian inner consciousness. In this regard, I should point out that such a critique 
has been already put forward by numerous Husserl scholars (see Küng 1978, p. 173; 
Gurwitsch 1979, pp. 89–90; Zahavi 1998, pp. 131–140; Jordan 2016, pp. 21–22). How-
ever, I think that my exposition of the critique is more rigorous, both from an exegetical 
and a systematic point of view, for unlike those scholars, I scrutinize the attempts to 







2   Brentano’s account of inner consciousness 
 
According to Brentano’s most famous thesis (also known as Brentano’s thesis), what 
characterizes a mental phenomenon is the directedness towards an object.1 To put it 
succinctly: 
 
(B1) Every mental phenomenon is consciousness of an object. 
 
In chapter 2 of the second volume of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (hence-
forth: PES II), Brentano distinguishes two senses of the term “conscious” (bewusst):2 in 
an active sense (consciousa), x is said to be consciousness of an object, whereas in a 
passive sense (consciousp), x is said to be an object of consciousness. Thus, in Brentano’s 
framework, every mental phenomenon is consciousa (see B1 above), and “x is uncon-
sciousp” means “x is not an object of consciousness.” 
The claim that Brentano aims to argue for in chapter 2 of PES II is the following: 
 
(B2) Every mental phenomenon is an object of consciousness. 
 
In other words, he wants to argue that every mental phenomenon is conscious in both 
an active and a passive sense. To begin the discussion, Brentano formulates the follow-
ing question: is an unconsciousp consciousness possible? Given his distinction between 
the two senses of “conscious,” the expression “unconscious consciousness” is not nec-
essarily contradictory: if “unconscious” is meant in a passive sense, then the contra-
diction is easily avoided. Consider hearing, which is a mental phenomenon. One could 
formulate the question: is an unconsciousp hearing possible? That is, is a hearing which 
is not an object of consciousness possible? Brentano’s principal aim in chapter 2 of PES 
II is to defend B2. More specifically, he wants to argue that B2, when suitably clarified, 
does not incur an infinite regress. In Brentano’s terms, B2 says that for every mental 
phenomenon there is an inner consciousness of it. By “inner consciousness” (or “inner 
perception”) Brentano means simply a consciousness (or a perception) of a mental phe-
nomenon (see Brentano 1995a [1874], p. 78 note). He uses various expressions to indi-
cate the tangential character of inner consciousness: it “accompanies” (begleitet) the 
mental phenomenon, which therefore is “co-apprehended” (miterfasst), that is, appre-
hended “accessorily” (en parergo), “incidentally” (nebenbei), or “additionally” (als Zu-
gabe). Let us take a closer look at Brentano’s theory. 
3/20 
 
According to Brentano’s account of inner consciousness, every mental phenomenon 
has two objects (see Brentano 1995a [1874], pp. 97–98). Consider again hearing: sound 
is said to be the primary object of hearing, whereas the hearing itself is said to be the 
secondary object of hearing. Thus Brentano speaks also of “primary consciousness” (in 
our example, consciousness of the sound) and “secondary consciousness” (in our ex-
ample, consciousness of hearing), where secondary consciousness is inner conscious-
ness.3 He thus proposes what is known as the double relation (Doppelbeziehung) thesis: 
every mental phenomenon has (primarily) a relation to something distinct from it and 
(secondarily) a relation to itself. This is the core of self-representationalism, which is 
in fact a neo-Brentanian theory of consciousness.  
Saying that intentionality can be reflexive, the double relation thesis allows Brentano 
to block an infinite regress. Indeed, the Brentanian explanation of B2 does not say that 
for every mental phenomenon M, M is the object of a distinct4 mental phenomenon 
(say, M'), but rather that for every mental phenomenon M, M is the object of M.5 Thus, 
Brentano says, in the case of the hearing there are just two phenomena: the sound, 
which is a physical phenomenon, and the hearing, which is a mental phenomenon. 
Still, the statements that Brentano makes in PES II have given rise to three different 
(and incompatible) readings of his account. Let us refer to primary consciousness as 
C1 and secondary consciousness as C2. Here are the three readings: 
 
The identity thesis (henceforth: IT): C1 and C2 are identical. 
The constituency thesis (henceforth: CT): C1 is to C2 as a part of x is to x. 
The fusion thesis (henceforth: FT): C1 is to C2 as a part p of x is to a part p' of x. 
 
It is worth noting that while FT is formulated in these terms by Brentano himself, CT 
can arise only if we translate Brentano’s vague statements into the language of mere-
ology. Let us consider these readings one by one. 
 
2.1   The identity thesis 
 
The statements which seem to validate IT6 are the following: 
 
i. It is only by considering a mental phenomenon in its relation to two different 




ii. Every mental phenomenon “can be considered under different aspects (Seite)” 
(Brentano 1995a [1874], p. 119), that is, as primary consciousness or as second-
ary consciousness. 
 
Recently, IT has been defended by Kriegel (2018). By focusing on the second statement, 
Kriegel proposes to read Brentano’s account of inner consciousness in light of a Fre-
gean concept of identity; C1 and C2 would then be to the mental phenomenon as the 
morning star and the evening star are to the planet Venus. Though there are two mean-
ings, they have the same reference: one and the same mental phenomenon (the hear-
ing, say) can be framed either as “consciousness of the sound” or as “consciousness of 
itself.” He backs up his interpretation by invoking Brentano’s mereology of conscious-
ness. Indeed, according to Kriegel’s (2018, pp. 87–93) reading of the first statement, C1 
and C2 are parts only in thought, that is, they are merely conceptual parts. Kriegel claims 
that this is what Brentano means when he states that C1 and C2 are “distinctional parts” 
or “divisives.” Ultimately, Kriegel’s interpretation is quite sophisticated (or “impres-
sionistic”, in his own words): on the one hand, C1 and C2 are meant to exist just as 
ways of framing a mental phenomenon: as such―i.e. as meanings―they are not identi-
cal. On the other hand, C1 and C2 are meant to be conceptualizations of one and the same 
entity (the mental phenomenon). In this sense, they are identical.8 Such a reading is 
highly disputable for two exegetical reasons: first, because Brentano explicitly denies 
that C1 and C2 are identical, since in his mereology a part x of y cannot be identical 
either with a part z of y, or with y;9 and second, because distinctional parts or divisives 
are not parts only in thought, but rather are real parts―i.e. parts in reality―which are 
separable only in thought. In the next section I will try to show that the second point is 
the ground for the correct interpretation of Brentano’s first statement.  
Moreover, if other theses presented in PES II are taken into account, it can be shown 
that IT is exegetically implausible. Indeed, Brentano ascribes to C1 and C2 contradictory 
properties: C1 is said to be fallible (see Brentano 1995a [1874], p. 72), whereas C2 is said 
to be infallible. Hardly anyone would claim that two qualitatively distinguishable 
things can be one and the same thing. 
 
2.2   The constituency thesis 
 




i. Primary consciousness “contributes innerly to the being” (Brentano 1995a 
[1874], p. 98; translation slightly modified) of secondary consciousness. 
ii. The object of primary consciousness “belongs to the content”11 of secondary 
consciousness. 
 
First of all, it should be noted that CT is consistent with a thesis which Brentano en-
dorses, namely, that inner consciousness is infallible (see Brentano 1995a [1874], passim). 
For if C1 is a part of C2, it is not possible that C2 really exists and C1 does not really 
exist; this follows from the premise that if x is a part of y, then the real existence of y 
entails the real existence of x (see Brentano 1995a [1874], p. 71). This means that when 
we are conscious of the hearing, it is not possible that we are hallucinating the con-
sciousness of the sound. In contrast, when we are conscious of the sound, it is possible 
that we are hallucinating the sound. C1 may be thought to be fallible because the sound 
is part of the hearing only in an improper sense (i.e. it is not really a part of the hearing). 
In Brentano’s words, the sound is only a modifying part of the hearing (see section 3 
below). 
In my reconstruction, CT is formulated in mereological terms (“C1 is to C2 as a part 
of x is to x”). Hence, it seems as if both the phrases “contributes innerly to the being” 
and “belongs to the content” can be interpreted in such terms. However, while a mer-
eological reading of the first statement is welcome, a mereological reading of the sec-
ond one would give rise to difficulties in Brentano’s framework. Indeed, “the sound 
belongs to the content of C2” cannot mean “the sound is a part of C2.”, for if the sound 
were a part of C2, then the real existence of C2 would entail the real existence of the 
sound. However, this is not the case: when I hallucinate the sound, my (non-veridical) 
hearing really exists, but the sound does not; a fortiori, when I hallucinate the sound, 
my consciousness of the (non-veridical) hearing really exists, but the sound does not.  
At this point we are urged to find a reading which does not lead us to conceive of 
the object of C1 as a part of C2. I think all we need is transitivity (of consciousness): it 
does not entail mereological relations, but only intentional ones. Letting xCy stand for 
“x is consciousness of y,” we have: 
 
(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)((xCy ∧ yCz) → xCz) 
 
Thus, in stating that the object of C1 “belongs to the content” of C2, Brentano could 
have meant that the consciousness of the hearing, being consciousness of the consciousness 
of the sound, is also consciousness of the sound. 
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2.3   Interlude: the duplication argument 
 
According to Textor, IT and CT are closely connected with the so-called duplication 
argument. This can be reconstructed as follows. Assume that C1 and C2 are distinct en-
tities, and hence are two consciousnesses. For Brentano, (i) the sound is consciousp only 
once, (ii) two consciousnesses have two objects, and (iii) the sound is consciousp both 
in C1 and C2. Thus, one can argue as follows: 
 
(i) The sound is consciousp only once. 
(ii) Two consciousnesses have two objects. 
(iii) The sound is consciousp both in C1 and C2. 
(iv) C1 and C2 are two consciousnesses. 
(v) ∴ The sound is consciousp twice. [from (ii), (iii), and (iv)] 
 
As can be seen, there is a contradiction between (i) and (v), and so (iv) is false by re-
ductio. Textor argues that the denial of (iv) is the way round Brentano finds to avoid 
the duplication of the primary object (the sound). In an earlier article, Textor (2006, pp. 
417–421) argued that CT is the positive way round that Brentano finds to avoid such a 
difficulty: C1 is part of C2; hence, so the argument goes, the sound is consciousp only 
once. More recently, however, he (Textor 2017, p. 56) has argued that IT is what Bren-
tano needs for solving the problem. The reason for Textor’s shift might be that he re-
alized that CT maintains that C1 and C2 are distinct consciousnesses (the first one is a 
part of the second), though just one whole exists (namely C2). 
But is such an interpretation correct? It is not, I submit. Arguably, Brentano could 
accept all the premises of the so-called duplication argument. Let us start with (iii). As 
we know, this premise is a rewording of the second statement that seems to validate 
CT. It has been rightly observed (see Textor 2017, p. 56) that (iii) is a disputable prem-
ise, which as such is in need of further argument. Nevertheless, Brentano (1995a [1874], 
p. 94) takes it to be evident (einleuchtend).  
Now consider (ii) and (iv). In PES II Brentano asks himself the following question: 
in hearing the sound, are there many consciousnesses?12 His reply is complex: if we 
want to determine the number of consciousnesses according to the number of mental 
phenomena, then the answer is negative; but if we want to determine the number of 
consciousnesses according to the number of objects, then the answer is positive. At this 
point he puts forwards two theses:  
 
(T1) If there are many consciousnesses, then there are many objects. 
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(T2) If there are many objects, then there are many consciousnesses.  
 
T1 is stated only implicitly. Brentano expressly contends that the conjunction of (iii) 
and (iv) engenders the duplication of the primary object. Why? Because many con-
sciousnesses have many objects. Hence (ii) is a Brentanian premise.    
On to T2. Strange as it may seem, it still complies with the double relation thesis: 
mental phenomena are not individuated by their objects, since one mental phenome-
non (the hearing) has two objects (the sound and itself). By contrast, consciousnesses 
are individuated by their objects: if there are two objects, then there are two conscious-
nesses. A fortiori, if there are different objects, then there are different consciousnesses. 
This is the case of C1 and C2, and this is why Brentano cannot deny (iv). His attempt to 
solve the problem of duplication is not IT, but rather FT: he does not claim that C1 and 
C2 are identical; he claims that C1 and C2 are (distinct but) fused.13 Let us have a close 
look at this claim.  
 
2.4   The fusion thesis 
 
The statements which seem to validate FT14 are the following: 
 
i. A “fusion” (Verschmelzung; Brentano 1995a [1874], pp. 100, 107) between the 
consciousness of the hearing and the consciousness of the sound subsists. 
ii. Secondary consciousness “belongs to” (gehört mit) (Brentano 1995a [1874], p. 99, 
translation slightly modified) the mental phenomenon itself. 
iii. Secondary consciousness “is given in” (Brentano 1995a [1874], pp. 100, 119, 
translation slightly modified) the mental phenomenon itself. 
iv. Primary consciousness and secondary consciousness are parts of a unitary phe-
nomenon.15 
 
From FT it follows that a mental phenomenon is not a simple thing, for it contains a 
multiplicity of parts. Accordingly, C1 and C2 are said to be “partial phenomena” 
(Theilphänomene). From an exegetical point of view, FT seems to be the best candidate 
to express Brentano’s account of inner consciousness. Indeed, while IT and CT are 
mostly inferred from some (few!) statements by Brentano, FT is explicitly formulated 
and treated at length: chapter 4 of PES II is dedicated mainly to a systematic presenta-
tion of C1 and C2 as (real) parts of a mental phenomenon. 
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From a systematic point of view, the questions are basically two: whether FT avoids 
the duplication of the primary object, and whether FT entails an infinite regress.  
Regarding the first question, I argue that if one assumes that (i) C1 and C2 are divi-
sives of a mental phenomenon (i.e. FT), that (ii) the sound is consciousp in both C1 and 
C2―which can be interpreted to mean that transitivity (of consciousness) holds―and 
that (iii) two consciousnesses have two objects, then the answer is no. Indeed, divisives 
are necessarily distinct entities. I conclude that Brentano’s account is still threatened 
by the problem of duplication.  
As for the second question, Textor (2006, pp. 424–430; 2013, pp. 477–480) argues that 
FT is precisely what allows Brentano to avoid an infinite regress. According to Textor, 
the reason why Brentano’s account would not incur an infinite regress is that he denies 
what Textor calls Exclusivity, that is, the idea that C2 is directed only at C1. In fact, Bren-
tano states that C2 is directed at the mental phenomenon “in its totality” (seiner Totalität 
nach) (Brentano 1995a [1874], p. 100, translation slightly modified), that is, at a whole 
made up of (at least) C1 and C2, or in Textor’s notation, the object of C2 is not C1, but 
{C1 + C2}. Against Textor, I will argue that it is precisely because Brentano holds this 
thesis (which presupposes FT) that his account incurs an infinite regress. 
 
3   Fundamentals of Brentano’s mereology of consciousness 
 
In order to better understand FT (and CT), Brentano’s mereology, in particular his 
mereology of consciousness, has to be taken into account.16 In the second chapter of 
Descriptive Psychology (henceforth: DP), entitled “Elements of Consciousness,” the 
basic notion of mereology, namely, the notion of part, is not explicitly defined. How-
ever, we can find it indirectly by looking at the notion of modifying part (or part in a 
modified sense) (see Brentano 1995b [1887], pp. 28–30). For Brentano, x is a modifying 
part of y if and only if x is not properly (i.e. not really) in y; for example, the sound is a 
modifying part of the hearing. Thus, the following definition of (real) part can be de-
rived: x is a part of y if and only if x is properly (i.e. really) in y. In my example, the 
hearing is a part of consciousness. 
In chapter 2 of DP, Brentano distinguishes two kinds of part (see Brentano 1995b 
[1887], pp. 15–17, 23–24): (1) separable parts and (2) distinctional parts. Note that these 
parts are not parts in a physical sense (for they are parts in a descriptive sense), nor are 
they parts in an improper sense: if x is a separable part of y, then x is properly (i.e. really) 
in y, and if x is a distinctional part of y, then x is properly (i.e. really) in y.17 
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Separable parts. A part x is separable (ablösbar) from a part y if and only if x can con-
tinue to exist in a whole even if y ceases to exist in that whole. Brentano distinguishes 
two kinds of separability: (1.1) One-sided separability and (1.2) two-sided separability. 
A one-sided separability holds between parts x and y if and only if x is separable from 
y but y is not separable from x; a two-sided separability holds between parts x and y if 
and only if x is separable from y and y is separable from x. An example of (1.1) is the 
relationship between presenting and willing; an example of (1.2) is the relationship 
between seeing and hearing. 
Distinctional parts. If x does not have separable parts, then x is an element. However, 
elements can be said to have further parts; Brentano calls these “distinctional parts” or 
“divisives.” Parts x and y are distinctional parts with respect to each other if and only 
if x is not separable from y and y is not separable from x. As an example of divisives 
Brentano speaks of the two halves of an atom: in an atom we can distinguish (unter-
scheiden) one half from the other, but we cannot separate the first half from the second, 
and vice versa. There are two kinds of distinctional parts: (2.1) Mutually pervading parts 
and (2.2) logical parts (genus and species). Examples of (2.1) are, in visual sensation, 
spatial determination and quality, and in the judgement “There is a truth,” affirmative 
quality and evidence. Examples of (2.2) are colour and yellow, and seeing-colour and 
seeing-yellow. 
Prima facie, distinctionality and separability mutually exclude one another, that is, it 
seems as if for every part p, p is distinctional if and only if p is not separable. However, 
Brentano’s definition of (2.2) complicates the relationship between (1) and (2), for he 
claims that a genus is “distinctionally separable” from the species. More precisely, in 
cases of (2.2) a one-sided distinctional separability holds. For example, colour is dis-
tinctionally separable from yellow, but yellow is not distinctionally separable from col-
our. The reason seems to be clear: a colour does not have to be specified as yellow, 
whereas yellow is necessarily a colour. 
The matter becomes more complex if one looks at Brentano’s discussion of the rela-
tionship between C1 and C2 in chapter 2 of DP. There he claims that C1 and C2 are 
distinctional parts (of a mental phenomenon), but he specifies (see Brentano 1995b 
[1887], pp. 24–27): 
 
(a) The connection between C1 and C2 is not a connection between mutually pervading parts. 




The ground for asserting (a) is that while in the judgement “There is a truth,”’ affirm-
ative quality and evidence have a relation to one and the same object (namely, the 
truth; see (2.1)), C1 and C2 have a relation to different objects (the sound and the hear-
ing). The ground for asserting (b) is that, just as C1 is not a genus with respect to C2, so 
C2 is not a genus with respect to C1. 
In discussing (a), Brentano claims that the relationship between C1 and C2 is similar 
to the one that holds between separable parts like seeing and hearing (see (1.2)). In fact, 
he claims that the relationship between C1 and C2 is similar to a relationship of two-
sided separability! After tracing this similarity, which remains quite obscure, Brentano 
contrasts the two relationships in stating that while between seeing and hearing real 
separability holds, between C1 and C2 (only) distinctional separability holds.18 The notion 
of distinctional separability seems therefore to coincide with the notion of separability 
in an improper sense. While parts x and y are said to be separable parts with respect to 
each other if and only if x is really separable (i.e. separable in a proper sense) from y and 
y is really separable from x, parts x and y are said to be distinctional parts with respect 
to each other if and only if x is not really separable (i.e. separable in an improper sense) 
from y and y is not really separable from x.  
We are now in a position to determine the mereological status of C1 and C2. Borrow-
ing an expression from Kriegel (2018, pp. 87–93)―but rejecting his reading (see section 
2.1 above)―one can say that C1 and C2 are real parts (of the mental phenomenon) which 
are separable only in thought.   
 
4   Brentano and the infinite regress problem 
 
At this stage, I want to decide whether Brentano faces the infinite regress problem and 
whether he is able to offer a solution to it. As I said, I distinguish two kinds of regress: 
external infinite regress and internal infinite regress. These two may be defined as fol-
lows: 
External infinite regress. An infinite regress is external if and only if every member of 
it is distinct from every other, and between its members no part-whole relationship 
holds. Hence, if x and y are members of an external infinite regress, then x is not part 
of y nor is y part of x. 
Internal infinite regress. An infinite regress is internal if and only if every member of 
it is distinct from every other, and between its members a part-whole relationship 
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holds. Hence, if x and y are members of an internal infinite regress, then either x is part 
of y or y is part of x. 
I should point out that Brentano does not make such a distinction. However, since he 
describes consciousness in mereological terms, a consideration of both regresses turns 
out to be unavoidable (see also Küng 1978, p. 173).    
Here are the two premises which engender an external infinite regress (henceforth: 
R1): 
 
(P1) Secondary consciousness is a mental phenomenon. 
(P2) Every mental phenomenon is the object of a distinct mental phenomenon. 
 
P1 can be rephrased as: 
 
(P1*) Inner consciousness is a mental phenomenon. 
 
Where P2 is meant to imply that between mental phenomena no part-whole relation-
ships hold: M is not part of M' and M' is not part of M. If we assume P1/P1* and P2, 
then R1 can be demonstrated as follows: (i) C2 is a mental phenomenon M; (ii) Every 
mental phenomenon is the object of a distinct mental phenomenon; (iii) C3 (of C2) exists 
(from (i) and (ii)); (iv) C3 is a mental phenomenon M'; (v) C4 (of C3) exists (from (ii) and 
(iv)); and so on ad infinitum. In other words, inner consciousness implies inner con-
sciousness of inner consciousness, where the second inner consciousness is a con-
sciousness that is external to the first. This is the kind of infinite regress for which high-
er-order theories are usually criticized.  
Does Brentano accept the premises which engender R1? As for P1/P1*, it is not en-
tirely clear whether Brentano would endorse it: on the one hand, in his framework the 
concept of mental phenomenon seems to be reserved to the act in its totality: when 
considering the hearing with all its parts, it seems that we are allowed to call mental 
phenomenon only the hearing as a whole. On the other hand, C2 is described as a (par-
tial) phenomenon, thus one might legitimately ask which kind of phenomenon C2 is. It 
is very implausible that it is a physical phenomenon, for we are talking about conscious-
ness; therefore, it seems that C2 is a mental phenomenon (all phenomena being either 
mental or physical). Since it is disputable that P1/P1* is a Brentanian premise, the only 
way to assure us that Brentano does not incur R1 is to certify that he denies P2. This is 
the case: the double relation thesis allows him to stop this regress.  
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However, I argue that Brentano’s way of describing the infinite regress he wants to 
avoid (which in fact is R1) is not correct: indeed, in this case he speaks of an “infinite 
complexity” (Brentano 1995a [1874], p. 81), or more precisely, of an “infinite series of 
phenomena whose individual members become more and more complex, ad infinitum” 
(Brentano 1995a [1874], p. 94, translation slightly modified). As I will show, the sort of 
infinite regress described by Brentano (which I call internal infinite regress) is not en-
tailed by P1/P1* and P2, but by other premises which in my view are endorsed by 
Brentano himself. 
Here are the three premises which engender an internal infinite regress (henceforth 
R2): 
 
(P3) Secondary consciousness is part of the mental phenomenon.19 
(P4) Consciousness of x entails consciousness of (all of) the parts of x. 
(P5) Consciousness of x is not identical to consciousness of a part of x. 
 
P3 can be rephrased as: 
 
(P3*) Inner consciousness is part of the mental phenomenon. 
 
P4 could be rephrased as: If x is consciousp and y is part of x, then y is consciousp. P4 
and P5 respectively entail: 
 
(P4*) Consciousness of a mental phenomenon M entails consciousness of (all of) the parts 
of M. 
(P5*) Inner consciousness of x is not identical to inner consciousness of a part of x. 
 
If we assume P3*, P4*, and P5*, then R2 can be demonstrated as follows: (i) C2 is part 
of the mental phenomenon M; (ii) consciousness of M entails consciousness of (all of) 
the parts of M; (iii) inner consciousness of x is not identical to inner consciousness of a 
part of x; (iv) C3 (of C2) exists (from (i), (ii), and (iii)); (v) C3 is part of C2; (vi) C4 (of C3) 
exists (from (ii), (iii), and (iv)); and so on ad infinitum. In other words, inner conscious-
ness implies inner consciousness of inner consciousness, where the second inner con-
sciousness is a consciousness internal to the first.  
One could question the passage from (i) and (ii) to (iii): why C3 (of C2) and not still 
C2 (of C2)? Let us reconstruct the argument. Here is the first set of premises: P3/P3* 
(C2 is part of the mental phenomenon M, from FT) and P4 (Consciousness of x entails 
consciousness of (all of) the parts of x), from which it follows that consciousness of M 
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entails consciousness of (all of) the parts of M (from P4) and consciousness of M entails 
consciousness of C2 (from P3 and P4). Here C2 stands for “consciousness of M,” “con-
sciousness of C2” stands for “consciousness of consciousness of M,” “consciousness of 
M” stands for “inner consciousness,” and “consciousness of consciousness of M” 
stands for “inner consciousness of inner consciousness.” The implicit premise says that 
consciousness of inner consciousness is inner consciousness. It is worth noting that up 
to this point there is no infinite regress. 
Now the second set of premises: P3/P3* (C2 is part of the mental phenomenon M) 
and P5 (consciousness of x is not identical to consciousness of a part of x). These prem-
ises entail that consciousness of M is not identical to consciousness of C2. Since “con-
sciousness of M” stands for C2, it follows that C2 is not identical to consciousness of C2. 
Let us therefore write “consciousness of C2” as C3, and let us call C2 first-order inner 
consciousness and C3 second-order inner consciousness (recall that C2 is consciousness of 
M, whereas C3 is consciousness of a part of M). By FT, C3 is part of C2, which entails, 
by transitivity (of parthood), that C3 is part of M. It then follows that C3 entails con-
sciousness of consciousness of C2, and that C3 is not identical to consciousness of con-
sciousness of C2, and so on. Therefore, every M has an infinite number of inner con-
sciousnesses as its parts. More precisely: if we assume P1/P1*, then we face an infinite 
regress of mental phenomena; if we do not, then we still face an infinite regress of inner 
consciousnesses.  
Should all the premises that engender R2 be considered part and parcel of the 
Brentanian outlook? Let me consider them one by one. 
We have seen that P3 follows from FT, which seems to be the best candidate to ex-
press Brentano’s account of inner consciousness. Therefore, such a premise is surely a 
Brentanian premise. We may specify that C2 is a real part (of the mental phenomenon) 
and say that every M will have an infinite number of real inner consciousnesses as its 
parts. All these consciousnesses are divisives, and as such separable only in thought.  
As for P4, I argue that it can be taken to be a Brentanian premise as well. The sources 
for embracing this exegetical position are two. The first one is a passage from PES II: 
here Brentano declares that who “acknowledges” x, in so doing “acknowledges” each 
part of x.20 The second one is a passage from DP, where the converse thesis is pre-
sented: it is argued that the denial of any of the parts of something would contradict 
the acknowledgement of the whole.21 However, it should be noted that this second 
passage is thicker than the first one: indeed, Brentano adds that the parts are “concom-
itantly acknowledged” (mitanerkannt) and expands on this point by saying that the fact 
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that one acknowledges all the parts of something does not imply that each part is “spe-
cifically” (ausdrücklich, für sich) or “in particular” (im Besondern) acknowledged. One 
could claim that this latter statement is what makes P4 a non-Brentanian premise. I 
argue that such a claim would be an exegetical mistake. In this context, Brentano refers 
to the distinction between explicit consciousness and implicit consciousness―a distinc-
tion that in later texts will be refined (see Brentano 1995c [1911], p. 216, Brentano 1981 
[1933], p. 117; Brandl 2013, p. 54). Consider an instance of the act of seeing: the con-
sciousness of a red table is an explicit consciousness, whereas the consciousness of the 
red of the table is (only) an implicit consciousness. The table is specifically consciousp, 
whereas the red is (only) concomitantly consciousp. From this it does not follow that 
consciousness of x does not entail consciousness of (all of) the parts of x; it only follows 
that (explicit) consciousness of x does not entail explicit consciousness of each part of x. 
I conclude that there is no reason to deny that P4 is a Brentanian premise: we only need 
to conceive of the mental phenomenon as specifically consciousp and each inner con-
sciousness contained in it as (only) concomitantly consciousp.  
So we come to the crucial premise of the argument, namely P5. Before deciding 
whether it could be considered a Brentanian premise, I would like to discuss Borsato’s 
(2009, pp. 52–55) position on this matter. Briefly, he denies that P5 is universally valid, 
that is, valid for every consciousness. He argues that a defender of Brentano could 
avoid R2 by resorting to Husserl’s concept of implicit consciousness. Borsato states that 
implicit consciousness is the consciousness through which a part of x is given to us 
while we explicitly direct ourselves to x. For example, while we perceive a red ball, we 
explicitly direct ourselves to the (red) ball and the red is implicitly given to us. Borsato 
argues that in a case of implicit consciousness it is true that consciousness of x is iden-
tical to consciousness of a part of x. He asks us to conceive of first-order inner con-
sciousness (i.e. consciousness of M) as an explicit consciousness and second-order inner 
consciousness (i.e. consciousness of a part of M) as an implicit consciousness. Borsato’s 
reading of Husserl’s notion of implicit consciousness is exegetically and systematically 
disputable. Husserl rarely speaks of implicit consciousness, but more often of “implicit 
intention”―a synonym for partial intention (Partialintention) (see Husserl 1970, passim). 
A partial intention is an intention through which we implicitly intend a part of some-
thing. For example, in explicitly intending a red ball, we implicitly intend the red of 
the ball. If we explicitly intend the red of the ball, then a particular perception (Sonder-
wahrnehmung) arises. Husserl never states that the intention through which we ex-
plicitly intend x coincides with (i.e. is identical to) the intention through which we impli-
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citly intend a part of x. Rather, he embraces a phenomenological version of the “Com-
position as Identity” thesis:22 
 
(PCI) Consciousness of x is identical to consciousness of (all of) the parts of x. 
 
It is clear that PCI not only implies P4, but also that consciousness of (all of) the parts 
of x entails consciousness of x. Suppose we perceive a chair which is composed of a 
seat and three legs. According to PCI, to perceive that chair is nothing more than to 
perceive that seat and those three legs. Hence, assuming that M is composed only of 
C1 and C2, PCI says that to perceive M is identical to perceiving C1 and C2. By the same 
token, assuming that M is composed of C1 and an infinite series of inner conscious-
nesses, PCI says that to perceive M is identical to perceiving C1 and that series. 
Let us come back to Brentano: does he endorse P5? I have to concede that such a 
thesis does not appear in the works of Brentano that I am considering here. Neverthe-
less, I argue that P5 results from the combination of two Brentano’s statements. The 
first one has already been quoted (see section 2.1 above): a part of x cannot be identical 
to x. The second is in DP; it is as follows: for each part of the object there is a part of the 
mental phenomenon.23 In this regard, Brentano invites us to consider the act of seeing: 
we have to distinguish in it the (partial) consciousness of quality and the (partial) con-
sciousness of spatial determination (see Brentano 1995b [1887], p. 104). These con-
sciousnesses are distinctional parts of the act of seeing, and as such are distinct from 
the act of seeing itself. Now, just as the consciousness of quality (consciousness of a 
part of x), which is a part of the act of seeing, cannot be identical to the act of seeing 
(consciousness of x), second-order consciousness (consciousness of a part of M), which 
is a part of first-order consciousness (consciousness of M), cannot be identical to first-
order consciousness. From this one can easily derive P5*. I conclude that FT does not 
entail R1, but does entail R2.  
 
5   Concluding remarks 
 
Let me briefly summarize my results. From the exegetical point of view, I believe I have 
shown that FT is the best candidate to express Brentano’s account of inner conscious-
ness. I have substantiated this reading by examining Brentano’s mereology of con-
sciousness. From the systematic point of view, I have distinguished two kinds of infinite 
regress, and I have argued that internal infinite regress turns out to be inherent to 
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Brentanian inner consciousness. Such a regress is created by three premises: inner con-
sciousness is part of the mental phenomenon; consciousness of a mental phenomenon 
entails consciousness of (all of) the parts of it; inner consciousness of x is not identical 
to inner consciousness of a part of x. I believe I have demonstrated that all of these 
premises are Brentanian. Along the way, I have also argued that FT does not allow 
Brentano to avoid another crucial problem, namely the duplication of the primary ob-
ject.  
However, a question is still open: does Brentano consider infinite regress as such to 
be something “intrinsically impossible and contrary to experience” (Brentano 1995a 
[1874], p. 81), or does he consider just external infinite regress to be so? Since he states 
something general―that is, something which concerns the notion of infinite regress as 
such―I am inclined to think that the first alternative is more plausible than the second. 
 
Notes 
1 See Brentano (1995a [1874], p. 79): “We have seen that no mental phenomenon exists which is not, in 
the sense indicated above, consciousness of an object. However, another question arises, namely, 
whether there are any mental phenomena which are not objects of consciousness. All mental phenome-
na are states of consciousness; but are all mental phenomena conscious, or might there also be uncon-
scious mental acts?” 
2 See Brentano (1995a [1874], p. 79 note): “We use the term ‘unconscious’ in two ways. First, in an active 
sense, speaking of a person who is not conscious of a thing; secondly, in a passive sense, speaking of a 
thing of which we are not conscious. In the first sense, the expression ‘unconscious consciousness’ 
would be a contradiction, but not in the second. It is in the latter sense that the term ‘unconscious’ is 
used here.” 
3 In place of “consciousness,” Brentano speaks more often of “presentation” (Vorstellung). For the sake 
of terminological consistency in my exposition, I will always use “consciousness.” Note that primary 
consciousness and secondary consciousness are not defined by their objects. For example, the conscious-
ness of the sound is called “primary” not because it is a consciousness of the sound. Primary and sec-
ondary consciousness are defined rather by the relation to their objects: primary consciousness is obser-
vation (Beobachtung), whereas secondary consciousness is not observation (see Brentano 1995a [1874], p. 
99). In hearing the sound, the hearing cannot be observed. We can observe the hearing in remembering, 
but then it is the hearing that is observed, whereas the remembering cannot be observed. Again, we can 
observe the first remembering in a second remembering, but then the first remembering is observed, 
whereas the second remembering cannot be observed, and so on. Consequently, “primary” and “sec-
ondary” are relative designations: it can be that x is a primary object with respect to y while x is a sec-





4 In order to understand my arguments, one should bear in mind that in my framework, Distinctness 
(formally: x ≠ y) is the negation of Identity (formally: x = y). 
5 See, for example, Brentano (1995a [1874], pp. 98, 100, 119). Brentano’s source is Aristotle (Met. Λ.9), 
who writes: “It seems that knowing, perceiving, believing, and thinking are always of something else, 
but accessorily of themselves” (Фαίνεται δ᾽ἀεὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἑπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς 
δ᾽ἐν παρέργῳ). 
6 The name IT has been coined by Hossack (2002). 
7 See Brentano (1995a [1874], p. 98; translation slightly modified): “The presentation of the sound and 
the presentation of the presentation of the sound form a single mental phenomenon; it is only by con-
sidering it in its relation to two different objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and the other 
a mental phenomenon, that we dismember it conceptually into two presentations. In the same mental 
phenomenon in which the sound is presented we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon 
itself. What is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it has the sound as 
content within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at the same time. We can say that the sound is 
the primary object of the act of hearing, and that the act of hearing itself is the secondary object.” 
8 See Kriegel (2018, p. 92): “We might therefore say, doubtless somewhat impressionistically, that qua 
regarded the awareness and the awareness-of-awareness are different, even though in and of themselves 
they are identical.” 
9 See Brentano (1995a [1874], p. 124): “And it is clear that such real identity never holds between our 
concurrent mental activities, and that it will never be found between the diverse aspects of the simplest 
mental acts which were differentiated earlier. […] [A] divisive, which I distinguish as a part in a real 
thing, cannot be called identical with this thing and hence with the other divisives which can be distin-
guished in it.” 
10 The name CT has been coined by Textor (2006). 
11 See Brentano (1995a [1874], p. 103; translation slightly modified): “If we see a colour and have a 
presentation of our act of seeing, the colour which we see is also presented in the presentation of the 
seeing. This colour is a content of the act of seeing, but it also belongs to the content of the presentation 
of the act of seeing. […] We have recognized that the act of seeing and the presentation of this act are 
connected in such a way that the colour, as the content of the act of seeing, contributes at the same time 
to the content of the presentation of the presentation of this act. The colour, therefore, even though it is 
presented both in the act of seeing and in the presentation of the seeing, is still presented only once.” 
12 In fact, Brentano makes the hypothesis of many and diverse (mehrere und verschiedenartige) conscious-
nesses, that is, of consciousnesses which are distinguishable not only numerically, but also qualitatively; 
I believe, however, that numerical distinguishability is enough to make the argument. 
13 See Brentano (1995a [1874], pp. 97–98; translation slightly modified): “Now the question arises, in 
such a case, do we have many and diverse presentations or only a single one? Before answering this 
question we must become clear about whether we want to determine the number and the variety of 
presentations according to the number and variety of objects, or according to the number of mental acts 




under consideration we would have many presentations and that they are of different kinds; so much 
so that one of them constitutes the content of another, while having a physical phenomenon as its own 
content. If this were true, the physical phenomenon must, to a certain extent, belong to the content of 
both of these presentations, to that of one as its explicit object, to that of the other as, so to speak, its 
implicit object. It would seem, therefore, as Aristotle also noted, to turn out that the physical phenome-
non must be presented twice. Yet this is not the case. Rather, inner experience seems to prove undenia-
bly that the presentation of the sound is connected with the presentation of the presentation of the sound 
in such a peculiarly intimate way that its being at the same time contributes innerly to the being of the 
other.”  
14 The name FT has been coined by Kriegel (2018). 
15 See Brentano (1995a [1874], pp. 120–121; translation slightly modified): “Our investigation has shown 
that wherever there is a mental activity there is a certain multiplicity and complexity. Even in the sim-
plest mental state a double object is immanently present. […] But this lack of simplicity was not a lack 
of unity. The consciousness of the primary object and the consciousness of the secondary object are not 
each a phenomenon per se; rather, they are partial phenomena of one and the same unitary phenomenon. 
[…] We interpreted them, and had to interpret them, as parts of a unified real being. […] That to which 
the primary and the diversified secondary consciousness belonged was one thing, but obviously not an 
utterly simple thing.” Kriegel’s (2018, p. 93) translation of Theilphänomene as “apparent parts” is entirely 
wrong, for it erroneously inverts the subject (Phänomene) and the attribute (Theil). 
16 On Brentano’s mereology, see Baumgartner and Simons (1994) and Kriegel (2018, pp. 85–90). 
17 See Brentano (1995b [1887], p. 18): “In the blue spot one must therefore distinguish a particularity of 
colour and a particularity of place. These particularities are thus really contained in it, [they] are dis-
tinctional parts of them.” 
18 See Brentano (1995b [1887], p. 27; translation slightly modified): “The sensing of the colour and the 
concomitant sensing of this sensing are directed towards different objects. The present case is, in this 
respect, similar to those separable parts which we discerned earlier in the mental domain, like, e.g., 
seeing and hearing […]. Whereas the separation of the parts considered there can only be real, the parts 
considered here can only be separated distinctionally. This is why, having referred to the former as 
really separable mental parts, it was probably not wholly inappropriate to call the latter inseparable 
(distinctional) ones.” 
19 While Brentano denies that C1 is part of a sound, inferring from this that an unconsciousp sound is not 
something contradictory (see Brentano 1995a [1874], p. 71), he claims that C2 is part of the hearing. It 
seems therefore that an unconsciousp hearing is something contradictory. However―apparently linking 
unthinkability with contradictority―he also states that while C2 without C1 is a contradiction, C1 without 
C2 is not unthinkable (undenkbar). Hence, it seems that an unconsciousa C2 is something contradictory, 
whereas an unconsciousp C1 is not. In Brentanian terms, the unthinkability of x without y is proof of the 
union of x and y; however, this does not entail that y is unthinkable without x. C1 could be to C2 as will 
is to presentation (see (1.1)). On the unity between primary and secondary consciousness, see also Fré-




20 See Brentano (1995a [1874], p. 161; translation slightly modified): “By way of further clarification, I 
call attention to the fact that when someone acknowledges a whole, in so doing he acknowledges each 
part of the whole as well.” 
21 See Brentano (1995b [1887], p. 36; translation slightly modified): “And if the acknowledged thing is a 
whole with parts, then the parts are all, in a certain manner, concomitantly acknowledged. The denial 
of any of them would contradict the acknowledgement of the whole. Yet the individual part is, for this 
reason, by no means acknowledged [―] let alone judged [―] specifically (by itself) and in particular.” 
22 See Husserl (2004, p. 148; my translation): “However, the object itself must be identical to the entire 
complex of its determinations. […] Then, to perceive the object means to perceive all these determina-
tions.” 
23 See Brentano (1995b [1887], p. 104; translation slightly modified): “For, corresponding to the parts of 
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